Monia
30 Jul 2011 #61
Monia, you are the one who keeps saying the grass is blue, when it is clear for all to see that it isn't.
My statement are based on facts .Have you read a report or it is just your point of view ?
Polish final report on Smoleńsk aircrash
My statement are based on facts .Have you read a report or it is just your point of view ?
No. Stop Moaning, it isn't. It is based on blame-shifting. This is normal for you, to come out with the most outrageous lies that fly in the face of all evidence.
I'd remind you that this report is from your own government. But you still resort to hysteria, lies and contradiction in order to shift the blame. Disgraceful.
I'd remind you that this report is from your own government. But you still resort to hysteria, lies and contradiction in order to shift the blame. Disgraceful.
Monia
30 Jul 2011 #63
JonnyM comments :
Your comments are inappropriate and unfavorably oriented against Poland .
All your full of hate comments contradict the facts included in the report
I don`t support any side in my statements on this topic ( I am not PIS supporter by no means ) .
From now on I will not even read what you write.
You bring nothing useful to this forum. Anyone who wants to discuss with me at least tries to support his points with some evidences . The intensity of your hatred has no equal. With you I do not intend to share any information and do not answer to my comments. I have no pleasure to share my views with you .
the most outrageous lies
you still resort to hysteria, lies and contradiction
Poles were 100% at fault.
Moania, in best PiS style,
No. Stop Moaning,
Your comments are inappropriate and unfavorably oriented against Poland .
All your full of hate comments contradict the facts included in the report
I don`t support any side in my statements on this topic ( I am not PIS supporter by no means ) .
From now on I will not even read what you write.
You bring nothing useful to this forum. Anyone who wants to discuss with me at least tries to support his points with some evidences . The intensity of your hatred has no equal. With you I do not intend to share any information and do not answer to my comments. I have no pleasure to share my views with you .
Monia, this is a simple and well-known discussion technique. And in fact, it makes your position weaker. Since you are a lawyer, one should think that you have had some discussion classes, moot courts (I had when I was 18, many many years ago - I studied law, and got my degree, before I decided to join the army).
Fact of the matter is you don't like what you are hearing because your mind was already made up. Tough luck, love. The facts are as they are laid out in the report.
Fact of the matter is you don't like what you are hearing because your mind was already made up. Tough luck, love. The facts are as they are laid out in the report.
Your comments are inappropriate and unfavorably oriented against Poland .
True, practical and neutral. Stop Moaning, Monia.
The fact remains that the report makes it quite clear what happened, doesn't blame anyone else except Poles and if it doesn't fit your mindset, so be it.
It seems that you are looking to shift the blame away from Poles at all costs and are using any 'argument whether true or false. Generally false. Better to face reality and move forward.
Monia
30 Jul 2011 #66
And in fact, it makes your position weaker. Since you are a lawyer, one should think that you have had some discussion classes, moot courts (I had when I was 18, many many years ago - I studied law, and got my degree, before I decided to join the army).
Because I am contradicting your view ?
So , are you Master of Laws , then ?
Are you so mean for me because I am a lawyer , love ?
I don`t bring my personal matters into this forum . But I can say that sometimes legal matters can be very boring . I can assure you that we have (during 5 years of studying law in Poland ) all the knowledge about legal rhetoric .
Have you read the report , yet? I can give you a link to english version :)
I can assure you that we have (during 5 years of studying law in Poland ) all the knowledge about legal rhetoric .
You are not exactly exemplifying that here.
Have you read the report , yet? I can give you a link to english version :)
The original Polish version makes it quite clear. Poles and only Poles are to blame. No other country.
The recent Polish report is critisized by some aviation experts for overlooking the role of General B., the commander of Polish Air Force, who was present in the cockpit against the rules and could have added to the pilots` overall stress. It is true he didn`t exert any direct pressure on the crew (at least such thing wasn`t recorded) , he just read aloud the altitude from controls.
The Russian report from January considered his presence there as a very important factor.
The Russian report from January considered his presence there as a very important factor.
NomadatNet 1 | 457
30 Jul 2011 #69
The original Polish version makes it quite clear. Poles and only Poles are to blame. No other country.
Some Poles, some other Poles. They already did in their reports. Plus, some small blames to Russians too. And, that's normal - Russians too accept it in their report.
Well, If there was technical failure, there is no way to confirm it, because Russians destroyed what was left from the plane.All hard evidence gone or tampered with.....
There is not point in disusing it further, really.
:(
There is not point in disusing it further, really.
:(
dtaylor5632 18 | 1998
30 Jul 2011 #71
Didn't this happen ages ago? Why are we still discussing it? Only thing to discuss is how to get the ducks body out of the wawel...
Why are we still discussing it?
Because it is extremely interesting to see how Polish experts/authorities/common Poles look on the crash issue.
Only thing to discuss is how to get the ducks body out of the wawel...
No, let him rest in peace there. It is not a Polish tradition to take revenge on dead people, especially when they were patriots.
Monia
31 Jul 2011 #73
I gathered some valuable information from the report so I want to share them with you :
Aerodrome`s documentations and maps
It is not true that the actual aerodrom`e conditions , obstacles or vicinity of ravine were known to the plane`e crew . THey were not given a chance to be familiar with them .
This shows that the commander didn`t have proper and actual weather conditions during the flight . He received more accurate weather report just minutes before the crash .
TAWS system
The aircraft crew was using both : the radio and the barometric altimeter during the whole time of the flight .
The crew was not informed about the current air pressure from meteorological aerodrome`s crew due to the lack of proper instruments which were exemplified in my previous post, so they had to switch the barometer altimeter without precise data on the estimated by aircraft commander air pressure level . This proves that using the barometer altimeter to estimate the plane`s real height was useless in such case .
The commander had to do that in order to hear the Smolensk tower crew commands .
About the pilot
According to the results and findings of the report, the commander of the aircraft was extremely intelligent and very well-trained pilot. No one in given conditions would manage to do his task better .
He did not make any decision to land an aircraft .
Read about his intentions more from that segment of the report:
Having analysed all this, at 06:26
At 0626:18.5, the pilot was informed about the real weather conditions
[/quote]
He was confirmed by the Polish meteorologist as late as at 6.26 in his previous self made weather evaluation that landing was impossible, so it happened just a few minutes before the crash, so then he informed about the situation the protocol`s director and waited for a decision which airport he should choose - Moscow or Minsk. No decision was handed over back to him .
Aerodrome`s documentations and maps
The crew did not have access to current documentation of the SMOLENSK NORTH airfield. Data of the airfield was not provided in the RF&CIS AIP.
The approach charts maps of aerodrome were handed over by the Polish Embassy in Moscow to ATC Command
The content of the charts was incompatible with realities, as it also contained a scheme and description of approach to the 079 direction, together with navigation tools which have been decommissioned with a NOTAM, nr M2113/09103, since 15.10.2009.
The aerodrome‘s data, including: co-ordinates of aerodrome reference point, runway thresholds, location of inner and outer beacons (Inner NDB and Outer NDB) (all the coordinates on the approach chart), gathered in a system of references SK-42. The approach chart did not carry information in what system of reference the coordinates of individual fixes were given. Even at the time of handing the charts over to the Polish side such information was not disclosed.
The charts lack information which is key to air operations, e.g. altitude restrictions, descent gradient, descent vertical speed, a non-precision approach procedure for aircraft of various categories, and altitude/height to clear obstacles (OCA/H) Obstacle Clearance Altitude/Height).
The approach charts maps of aerodrome were handed over by the Polish Embassy in Moscow to ATC Command
The content of the charts was incompatible with realities, as it also contained a scheme and description of approach to the 079 direction, together with navigation tools which have been decommissioned with a NOTAM, nr M2113/09103, since 15.10.2009.
The aerodrome‘s data, including: co-ordinates of aerodrome reference point, runway thresholds, location of inner and outer beacons (Inner NDB and Outer NDB) (all the coordinates on the approach chart), gathered in a system of references SK-42. The approach chart did not carry information in what system of reference the coordinates of individual fixes were given. Even at the time of handing the charts over to the Polish side such information was not disclosed.
The charts lack information which is key to air operations, e.g. altitude restrictions, descent gradient, descent vertical speed, a non-precision approach procedure for aircraft of various categories, and altitude/height to clear obstacles (OCA/H) Obstacle Clearance Altitude/Height).
It is not true that the actual aerodrom`e conditions , obstacles or vicinity of ravine were known to the plane`e crew . THey were not given a chance to be familiar with them .
Weather conditions
SMOLEŃSK NORTH aerodrome was not property prepared to receive aircraft. Meteorological support was being realised improperly due to:
1) the failure of TWER air base met Office to do basic tasks which was atmospheric support of SMOLEŃSK PÓ£NOCNY. In particular, they did not predict fog and stratus layer clouds that were drawing near to the aerodrome (although they had access to atmospheric information from the territory of the Russian Federation that fog began to appear on the direction of advection as early as 00:10);
2) failure to publish at the specified time a STORM warning for SMOLEŃSK NORTH aerodrome notwithstanding continuous messages from the weatherman of abrupt weather;
3) failure of the 36 Regiment military airport to deliver to the crew of Tu-154M and the Regiment‘s Deputy Commander the weather forecast for the SMOLEŃSK-bound flight, which was prepared by meteorologist-on-duty at the Air Force Centre of Hydrometeorology.
4) failure of SMOLEŃSK NORTH Terminal Controller to pass to the crew of Tu-154M full information of prevailing atmospheric conditions – omitting information on cloud base (vertical visibility).
SMOLEŃSK NORTH aerodrome was not property prepared to receive aircraft. Meteorological support was being realised improperly due to:
1) the failure of TWER air base met Office to do basic tasks which was atmospheric support of SMOLEŃSK PÓ£NOCNY. In particular, they did not predict fog and stratus layer clouds that were drawing near to the aerodrome (although they had access to atmospheric information from the territory of the Russian Federation that fog began to appear on the direction of advection as early as 00:10);
2) failure to publish at the specified time a STORM warning for SMOLEŃSK NORTH aerodrome notwithstanding continuous messages from the weatherman of abrupt weather;
3) failure of the 36 Regiment military airport to deliver to the crew of Tu-154M and the Regiment‘s Deputy Commander the weather forecast for the SMOLEŃSK-bound flight, which was prepared by meteorologist-on-duty at the Air Force Centre of Hydrometeorology.
4) failure of SMOLEŃSK NORTH Terminal Controller to pass to the crew of Tu-154M full information of prevailing atmospheric conditions – omitting information on cloud base (vertical visibility).
This shows that the commander didn`t have proper and actual weather conditions during the flight . He received more accurate weather report just minutes before the crash .
TAWS system
The aircraft crew was using both : the radio and the barometric altimeter during the whole time of the flight .
The crew was not informed about the current air pressure from meteorological aerodrome`s crew due to the lack of proper instruments which were exemplified in my previous post, so they had to switch the barometer altimeter without precise data on the estimated by aircraft commander air pressure level . This proves that using the barometer altimeter to estimate the plane`s real height was useless in such case .
The pilot knew that the instrument can operate at QFE pressures, but the unit can only be used at airports “ stored in the instrument‘s database “ , the SMOLENSK NORTH airfield not being one of them. In such case TAWS system was useless and would give alarm on wrong altitude, so later it was switched off . But barometer was still in use by commander and he knew the data .
During the flight close to landing the aircraft commander‘s switched on the barometric altimeter at 1013 hPa , but this resulted, in the opinion of the Committee, from coming out of a warning signal of the TAWS . So , the commander switched the TAWS alarm .
During the flight close to landing the aircraft commander‘s switched on the barometric altimeter at 1013 hPa , but this resulted, in the opinion of the Committee, from coming out of a warning signal of the TAWS . So , the commander switched the TAWS alarm .
The commander had to do that in order to hear the Smolensk tower crew commands .
The way the action was performed may suggest that the aircraft commander knew the way the TAWS instrument worked, and knew how to react in order to silence the alarm.
The device is located on the instrument panel on the co-pilot side, and is operated by the co- pilot. The co-pilot function on that day was performed by the aircraft commander of April 10th.
Despite such knowledge, activation of the TAWS system came as a surprise for the crew, as the co-pilot (of April 10th) was not very familiar with the operation of the TAWS instrument, and had not prepared TAWS for operation on the airfield.
The device is located on the instrument panel on the co-pilot side, and is operated by the co- pilot. The co-pilot function on that day was performed by the aircraft commander of April 10th.
Despite such knowledge, activation of the TAWS system came as a surprise for the crew, as the co-pilot (of April 10th) was not very familiar with the operation of the TAWS instrument, and had not prepared TAWS for operation on the airfield.
About the pilot
According to the results and findings of the report, the commander of the aircraft was extremely intelligent and very well-trained pilot. No one in given conditions would manage to do his task better .
He did not make any decision to land an aircraft .
Read about his intentions more from that segment of the report:
Commander of Tu-154M – assessed and analysed correctly the atmospheric conditions prevailing at SMOLEŃSK NORTH. Although the met report from the military airport did not predict minimum atmospheric conditions – for on the aerodrome for the time of landing - he assessed correctly the info (06:14) from the Controller in Mińsk, also from the Terminal Controller and from the crew of Polish Yak-40.
Having analysed all this, at 06:26
[/quote]
[quote]he told the Diplomatic Protocol Director, who was in the cockpit, that in such atmospheric conditions any landing at SMOLEŃSK NORTH is out of the question and a decision is needed whether to hold in the air or make to an alternate airport;
[quote]he told the Diplomatic Protocol Director, who was in the cockpit, that in such atmospheric conditions any landing at SMOLEŃSK NORTH is out of the question and a decision is needed whether to hold in the air or make to an alternate airport;
after the Yak-40 landed at SMOLEŃSK NORTH airport at 05:17, for nearly 30 minutes from its planned landing, the controller at Warsaw Military Airport of the 36 Regiment did not ask its crew their weather observation of SMOLEŃSK NORTH area.
When he did, at 05:50, he passed this news to the met-on-duty as late as at 06:32, after intervention of the met-on-duty at the Air Force Centre of Hydrometeorology.
At 0626:18.5, the pilot was informed about the real weather conditions
, so he informed the Director of Diplomatic Protocol, still present in the cockpit: „Panie dyrektorze – wyszła mgła w tej chwili i w tych warunkach, które są obecnie, nie damy rady usiąść. Spróbujemy podejść – zrobimy jedno zajście – ale prawdopodobnie nic z tego nie będzie. Tak że proszę już myśleć nad decyzją, co będziemy robili‖. (Director – fog has come out now and under present conditions we will not manage to touch down. So please start thinking about your decision as to what we are going to do). Director said: „No to mamy problem‖ (So, we have a problem). The aircraft commander explained: „Możemy pół godziny powisieć i odchodzimy na zapasowe‖. (We may hang around for half an hour, then we part for alternate airfield). When asked about alternate airfields, he answered: „MIŃSK albo WITEBSK‖ (MINSK or VITEBSK). After the conversation, in the opinion of the Committee, the Director left the cockpit.
[/quote]
He was confirmed by the Polish meteorologist as late as at 6.26 in his previous self made weather evaluation that landing was impossible, so it happened just a few minutes before the crash, so then he informed about the situation the protocol`s director and waited for a decision which airport he should choose - Moscow or Minsk. No decision was handed over back to him .
delphiandomine 86 | 17823
31 Jul 2011 #74
Where it says it was him to decide . It was not his decision to land in Smolensk. Give me a source proving your statement .
I remind you that under aviation law, the commander of the plane has full responsibility for the flight. Civilian or military, it doesn't matter - the commander is the man in charge. It doesn't matter if Blasik was there, it doesn't matter if the Commander-in-Chief was there - none of them have the authority to overrule the designated commander of the plane - unless they withdraw his command.
If he wished to go somewhere else, it would be his decision and his decision only as to where they fly to.
It is not true that the actual aerodrom`e conditions , obstacles or vicinity of ravine were known to the plane`e crew . THey were not given a chance to be familiar with them .
So - a Polish mistake in not making such that such materials were available. They should have never allowed a flight to an aerodrome of which they had incomplete information, don't you think? Nothing to do with the Russians, everything to do with the Poles.
This shows that the commander didn`t have proper and actual weather conditions during the flight . He received more accurate weather report just minutes before the crash .
The Yak-40 guys made it pretty clear to them that things were bad there. Anyway - yes, you're right - and yet more reason why they should've never gone below 100m.
The crew was not informed about the current air pressure from meteorological aerodrome`s crew due to the lack of proper instruments which were exemplified in my previous post, so they had to switch the barometer altimeter without precise data on the estimated by aircraft commander air pressure level . This proves that using the barometer altimeter to estimate the plane`s real height was useless in such case .
Wrong. The transcripts issued clearly show that they had the correct air pressure - no-one has contradicted the air pressure given.
Incidentally - the action with the TAWS device was a deliberate act in order to silence it. They had the correct air pressure -there's no arguments about this. I can see that you're not familiar with these devices - but essentially, the device would scream "pull up, pull up" because Smolensk-North wasn't in its database. That's why they had to manipulate the barometric altimeter, in order to silence the device.
The commander had to do that in order to hear the Smolensk tower crew commands .
He didn't have to do that at all - the CVR recording makes it obvious that it was in the background.
No decision was handed over back to him .
It's an irrelevance, because in the event of failing to make a landing, they would "go around" and circle until a decision was made. Again - quite normal.
According to the results and findings of the report, the commander of the aircraft was extremely intelligent and very well-trained pilot. No one in given conditions would manage to do his task better .
Well trained? He wasn't even qualified to fly the TU-154M on that day!
Extremely intelligent? He took the plane below minima at an aerodrome that was more-or-less out of use in conditions where he had zero visibility. There's no escaping this.
If you ask me, the final blame lies at the door of the military. We know the Polish military is simply unfit for purpose - due to years of underinvestment and problems with nepotism. We can blame the controllers, the pilots, everyone - but at the end of the day, it's institutional failure on a large scale that led to this accident.
NomadatNet 1 | 457
31 Jul 2011 #75
Fog began to appear as early as 00:10 (met time histogram of climate data is available to access?)
Yak40 landed at Smolensk at 05:17 for half an hour - so, till 05:47 (but, Warsaw Military Airport controller didn't ask the crew of Yak40 about the weather.. This is strange.)
Then, the same controller in Warsaw Airport "asked" the weather condition at Smolensk at 05:50 and passed this info to the met-on-duty on 06:32, another half an hour.
Tu-154M pilot got the weather info probably by around 06:10 when he found itself already in the fog and confirmed it with the controller in Minsk at 06:14..
Confirmation of weather info with Warsaw, etc and decision making process in the airplane took about 15-20 minutes which wasn't enough and probably, the president made the final decision, landing, as remembering the airplane landed before in Georgia under difficult weather condition.
All those time delays above are absurd, especially when many top level officials were in the airplane. This is definitely 9/11 of Poland.
Yak40 landed at Smolensk at 05:17 for half an hour - so, till 05:47 (but, Warsaw Military Airport controller didn't ask the crew of Yak40 about the weather.. This is strange.)
Then, the same controller in Warsaw Airport "asked" the weather condition at Smolensk at 05:50 and passed this info to the met-on-duty on 06:32, another half an hour.
Tu-154M pilot got the weather info probably by around 06:10 when he found itself already in the fog and confirmed it with the controller in Minsk at 06:14..
Confirmation of weather info with Warsaw, etc and decision making process in the airplane took about 15-20 minutes which wasn't enough and probably, the president made the final decision, landing, as remembering the airplane landed before in Georgia under difficult weather condition.
All those time delays above are absurd, especially when many top level officials were in the airplane. This is definitely 9/11 of Poland.
Monia
31 Jul 2011 #76
The report examines the lighs system and the runaway path and gives such conclusions :
The light`s warning system was completely obscured by trees, which were several meters high above the norm . On the path of a runaway high trees were growing, which was not compatible with international rules . After the crach the pathway and lights system were cleared out of the trees .
The crash was caused by one wing hitting the tree. If there was no trees the crash would not happen , as pilot managed to pull the aircraft up and was able to land .
The above analysis indicates that the airport SMOLENSK NORTH was not properly
prepared to accept aircraft.
prepared to accept aircraft.
The light`s warning system was completely obscured by trees, which were several meters high above the norm . On the path of a runaway high trees were growing, which was not compatible with international rules . After the crach the pathway and lights system were cleared out of the trees .
The crash was caused by one wing hitting the tree. If there was no trees the crash would not happen , as pilot managed to pull the aircraft up and was able to land .
delphiandomine 86 | 17823
31 Jul 2011 #77
The light`s warning system was completely obscured by trees, which were several meters high above the norm . On the path of a runaway high trees were growing, which was not compatible with international rules .
What do you expect from a closed, decommissioned airport that was only reopened to deal with these flights?
More importantly, what the hell did the Polish expect?
The crash was caused by one wing hitting the tree. If there was no trees the crash would not happen , as pilot managed to pull the aircraft up and was able to land .
Again, more nonsense.
The crash was caused by the pilot going below minimums. Generally speaking, minima are there for a reason - go below them, and you're going to have problems.
Monia
31 Jul 2011 #78
Tu-154M pilot got the weather info probably by around 06:10 when he found itself already in the fog and confirmed it with the controller in Minsk at 06:14..
Wrong assumption - read the report and mu post about it
NomadatNet 1 | 457
31 Jul 2011 #79
What assumption? You wrote it above that pilot assessed the weather info with the controller in Minsk at 06:14... (this was given in the report, isn't it?)
Monia
31 Jul 2011 #80
If he wished to go somewhere else, it would be his decision and his decision only as to where they fly to.
That`s right he was waiting for the decision where to go : Witebsk or Minsk . He could go both ways but it was up to president to decide ( logistic conditions were crucial ) while both airports were prepared to assist in the plain to land , both airports had normal weather conditions.
Sadly you don`t want to hear the truth because you are Russian , but the truth is very crushiung for the Russian side.
The crash was caused by the pilot going below minimums
Controllers confirmed him that the plane was on the safe altitude , he was deprived of the proper information of the plane`s altitude due to the lack of current baromiter conditions which should be given by Smolensk meteorologist on duty in order to set up his altimeter on board of the plane .
delphiandomine 86 | 17823
31 Jul 2011 #81
Vitebsk was closed - which was another sign of the incompetence of the Air Force to have such an airport as an alternative.
Anyway, in the absence of a decision, he could circle Smolensk-North for upto half an hour while waiting for a decision. He could also try and land again - he had plenty of options.
The truth is in the Polish report, as far as I'm concerned. And that truth makes it clear that the ultimate responsibility for this crash lies at the hands of the commander.
He had the current barometer - it's given quite clearly to him. He decided to change it in order to silence the TAWS.
Anyway, let me teach you something about the concept of minima. The TU-154M's minima was actually 130m (what the ATC cleared him to has no relevance here) - which means that either radio or barometric, he should have never, ever gone below this. Now, a known characteristic of the TU-154M is that it drops about 20-40m before it starts to rise when you "pull up" - so he should've made that decision a bit higher, perhaps around 160m.
So - at 160m - if he couldn't see the runway, he should've pulled up and flew away. There were no trees at 160m, were there?
This is what most people simply don't understand.
Anyway, at the end of the day, *nothing* changes the fact that the commander put the plane into the ground.
Anyway, in the absence of a decision, he could circle Smolensk-North for upto half an hour while waiting for a decision. He could also try and land again - he had plenty of options.
Sadly you don`t want to hear the truth because you are Russian , but the truth is very crushiung for the Russian side.
The truth is in the Polish report, as far as I'm concerned. And that truth makes it clear that the ultimate responsibility for this crash lies at the hands of the commander.
Controllers confirmed him that the plane was on the safe altitude , he was deprived of the proper information of the plane`s altitude due to the lack of current baromiter conditions which should be given by Smolensk meteorologist on duty in order to set up his altimeter on board of the plane .
He had the current barometer - it's given quite clearly to him. He decided to change it in order to silence the TAWS.
Anyway, let me teach you something about the concept of minima. The TU-154M's minima was actually 130m (what the ATC cleared him to has no relevance here) - which means that either radio or barometric, he should have never, ever gone below this. Now, a known characteristic of the TU-154M is that it drops about 20-40m before it starts to rise when you "pull up" - so he should've made that decision a bit higher, perhaps around 160m.
So - at 160m - if he couldn't see the runway, he should've pulled up and flew away. There were no trees at 160m, were there?
This is what most people simply don't understand.
Anyway, at the end of the day, *nothing* changes the fact that the commander put the plane into the ground.
Monia
31 Jul 2011 #82
the weather info with the controller in Minsk at 06:14...
He needed the time to analyse the situation , do you think that the synoptic conditions are given in normal words or rather you get parameters from which you have to figure out real conditions .
NomadatNet 1 | 457
31 Jul 2011 #83
I think the parts in the report referencing blockboxes are not too credible, opinion of an expert here:
smolensk-2010.pl/2010-05-10-long-hands-of-fsb.html,
as there is a serious claim above that the blackboxes were decoded, partially deleted and or falsified. All info we have from inside the airplane should be taken aside for a while. In this stiuation, met reports from satellites too are not too credible, imo.
So, the only data we have is what is available from Warsaw and Minsk (considering that Russia is a suspect, forget their claims and words too as they are good at info chaosing.)
According to Polish report which is confirmed by Russians too, those times you mentioned above and I summarized above in my post above are strange definitely. Why there is a communication with Minsk too? It is to create further chaos in info? Minimal info is times you mentioned above are absurd definitely. As if "accident(!)" was tried to fit the accident book..
smolensk-2010.pl/2010-05-10-long-hands-of-fsb.html,
as there is a serious claim above that the blackboxes were decoded, partially deleted and or falsified. All info we have from inside the airplane should be taken aside for a while. In this stiuation, met reports from satellites too are not too credible, imo.
So, the only data we have is what is available from Warsaw and Minsk (considering that Russia is a suspect, forget their claims and words too as they are good at info chaosing.)
According to Polish report which is confirmed by Russians too, those times you mentioned above and I summarized above in my post above are strange definitely. Why there is a communication with Minsk too? It is to create further chaos in info? Minimal info is times you mentioned above are absurd definitely. As if "accident(!)" was tried to fit the accident book..
The light`s warning system was completely obscured by trees, which were several meters high above the norm . On the path of a runaway high trees were growing, which was not compatible with international rules . After the crach the pathway and lights system were cleared out of the trees .
Apparently it was safe enough for the Presidential security detail to clear it. The crew apparently thought it safe enough when they landed a couple of days before.
Vitebsk was closed btw.
Controllers confirmed him that the plane was on the safe altitude , he was deprived of the proper information of the plane`s altitude due to the lack of current baromiter conditions which should be given by Smolensk meteorologist on duty in order to set up his altimeter on board of the plane .
The radar altimeter doesn't require the pressure. Based on the recording, seems like they were following it.
Here's the outcome of the Polish report:
The descent below minimum descent altitude (MDA), with an excessive rate of descent, in atmospheric conditions which prevented visual contact with the runway. The decision to go-around was taken too late. This led to collision with terrain, the destruction of the left wing, consequently loss of control and loss of the aircraft.
avherald.com/h?article=429ec5fa/0034
delphiandomine 86 | 17823
31 Jul 2011 #85
Apparently it was safe enough for the Presidential security detail to clear it. The crew apparently thought it safe enough when they landed a couple of days before.
Strange that the same pilot managed to land there three days before in the same plane at the same airport, without problem - if it was really so dangerous, how come they managed then?
NomadatNet 1 | 457
31 Jul 2011 #86
Are you serious about this question? If I close your eyes, can you still walk easily on the narrow path that you walk everyday?
delphiandomine 86 | 17823
31 Jul 2011 #87
If I had the President, as well as many other VIP's on my back, then I wouldn't take the risk to begin with.
At the end of the day - even if there was systematic institutional failures - it doesn't excuse the commander.
Yes that all very nice, you are saying that if a plane loose engine and a wing it is still is fault of a commander.
Monia
31 Jul 2011 #89
he crew apparently thought it safe enough
Well , it was in different weather conditions , wasn`t it ?
Do you expect form the pilot to complain about the height of the trees , they would laugh at him , don`t be naive that any pilot would do it . It was up to his superiors to decide and give him actual conditions of the aerodrome , those ones he was handed over were false . Read the segment in the report how much of the area was covered by trees exceeding the norm .
FlaglessPole 4 | 649
31 Jul 2011 #90
Are you serious about this question? If I close your eyes, can you still walk easily on the narrow path that you walk everyday?
Nomad, I think your tightrope walking aspirations are pretty risqué, considering how many monarchists owe a pair of scissors…
Strange that the same pilot managed to land there three days before in the same plane at the same airport, without problem - if it was really so dangerous, how come they managed then?
Well, he obviously did it purely out of spite, to annoy a certain hysteriot prowling this forum.
(Yes, I’ve just coined a new word: hysteriot – a person who time and time again confuses patriotism with blind hysteria.)