sjam
5 Feb 2009
History / Yalta Conference and Poland [78]
Is it not now widely accepted that the Oder and Neisse line proposal (western boundary in German territory) was not originally a Soviet concept but one that was postulated much earlier by General Sikorski as a pragmatic solution to Poland's place in post-war Europe.
An approximation of the curzon line eastern boundary was also proposed by General Sikorski. The giving up of eastern Polish territory was to be compensated by the westward shift of Polish borders to the Oder and Neisse line again this was Sikorski's concept.
Therefore this thorny issue can't be fairly or entirely laid at either Stalin's, Roosevelt's or Churchill's door. The issue was that Sikorski's plan was obviously an anathema to many less pragmatic elements in the Polish-government-in-exile and was never likely to be acceptable to them.
Though ironically Sikorski's plan was eventually the settlement that became the post-war reality however the big difference was that Stalin (with the de facto occupation of central Europe by the Red Army) was able to exploit the weakness of his western allies (including the sidelined Polish-government-in-exile) to his own ends as there was no willingness by Roosevelt and Churchill to fight the Soviets over Poland's postwar borders as after all the USSR had played a major role (one could argue the major role) in the defeat the Nazi regime.
Solidly researched reference work that discusses Sikorski plan in detail:
Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943: Sarah Meiklejohn.
Is it not now widely accepted that the Oder and Neisse line proposal (western boundary in German territory) was not originally a Soviet concept but one that was postulated much earlier by General Sikorski as a pragmatic solution to Poland's place in post-war Europe.
An approximation of the curzon line eastern boundary was also proposed by General Sikorski. The giving up of eastern Polish territory was to be compensated by the westward shift of Polish borders to the Oder and Neisse line again this was Sikorski's concept.
Therefore this thorny issue can't be fairly or entirely laid at either Stalin's, Roosevelt's or Churchill's door. The issue was that Sikorski's plan was obviously an anathema to many less pragmatic elements in the Polish-government-in-exile and was never likely to be acceptable to them.
Though ironically Sikorski's plan was eventually the settlement that became the post-war reality however the big difference was that Stalin (with the de facto occupation of central Europe by the Red Army) was able to exploit the weakness of his western allies (including the sidelined Polish-government-in-exile) to his own ends as there was no willingness by Roosevelt and Churchill to fight the Soviets over Poland's postwar borders as after all the USSR had played a major role (one could argue the major role) in the defeat the Nazi regime.
Solidly researched reference work that discusses Sikorski plan in detail:
Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943: Sarah Meiklejohn.