Pan Kazimierz 1 | 195
8 Jul 2009 / #61
"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government."
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/bluebook/blbk17.htm
Shortly thereafter a formal agreement between Poland and Britain was signed which clearly stated "If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will at once come to the help of Poland."
Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 193.
Expectations of swift Allied action were also repeatedly reinforced by the British. For example, during Anglo-Polish General Staff talks held in Warsaw at the end of May, the Poles stressed the need for British aerial assaults on Germany should war break out. The British responded with assurances that the Royal Air Force would attack industrial, civilian, and military targets.[10] General Sir Edmund Ironside then repeated this promise during an official visit to Warsaw in July.
Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 94-95.
What transpired is by now well known. The RAF did not even attempt to bomb German military installations because, as the Air Staff concluded on September 20: "Since the immutable aim of the Allies is the ultimate defeat of Germany, without which the fate of Poland is permanently sealed, it would obviously be militarily unsound and to the disadvantage of all, including Poland, to undertake at any given moment operations ... unlikely to achieve effective results, merely for the sake of maintaining a gesture." The Chiefs of Staff agreed, informing 10 Downing Street that "nothing we can do in the air in the Western Theatre would have any effect of relieving pressure on Poland."[20] And so the RAF decided instead to drop propaganda leaflets.
Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 183-184.
The opportunity to fight a brief, localized war against Germany was therefore lost in September 1939. In hindsight, also lost were the opportunities to save millions of lives, to rid the world of Hitler, and to have prevented the creation of conditions that led to the Cold War. As General Ironside commented in 1945, after much of Europe was in ruins, "Militarily we should have gone all out against the German the minute he invaded Poland. ... We did not ... And so we missed the strategical advantage of the Germans being engaged in the East. We thought completely defensively and of ourselves."
Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, p. 249.
Are you suggesting that the Brits did exactly (or even remotely) as obliged? Seems like a betrayal to me. And of course, if we're going to revert to the topic of 'the Western Powers', where was France's "within fifteen days" invasion that could have saved both countries, except that it never came? Unless you're saying that technically the treaty was upheld because it was physically impossible for Britain to aid Poland with anything more effective than propaganda leaflets?
Tell me, General, what effect our leaflet raids have had?
- Churchill, in response to lamentation about the Polish Armed Force's effectiveness in fighting the Germans.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/bluebook/blbk17.htm
Shortly thereafter a formal agreement between Poland and Britain was signed which clearly stated "If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will at once come to the help of Poland."
Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 193.
Expectations of swift Allied action were also repeatedly reinforced by the British. For example, during Anglo-Polish General Staff talks held in Warsaw at the end of May, the Poles stressed the need for British aerial assaults on Germany should war break out. The British responded with assurances that the Royal Air Force would attack industrial, civilian, and military targets.[10] General Sir Edmund Ironside then repeated this promise during an official visit to Warsaw in July.
Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 94-95.
What transpired is by now well known. The RAF did not even attempt to bomb German military installations because, as the Air Staff concluded on September 20: "Since the immutable aim of the Allies is the ultimate defeat of Germany, without which the fate of Poland is permanently sealed, it would obviously be militarily unsound and to the disadvantage of all, including Poland, to undertake at any given moment operations ... unlikely to achieve effective results, merely for the sake of maintaining a gesture." The Chiefs of Staff agreed, informing 10 Downing Street that "nothing we can do in the air in the Western Theatre would have any effect of relieving pressure on Poland."[20] And so the RAF decided instead to drop propaganda leaflets.
Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, pp. 183-184.
The opportunity to fight a brief, localized war against Germany was therefore lost in September 1939. In hindsight, also lost were the opportunities to save millions of lives, to rid the world of Hitler, and to have prevented the creation of conditions that led to the Cold War. As General Ironside commented in 1945, after much of Europe was in ruins, "Militarily we should have gone all out against the German the minute he invaded Poland. ... We did not ... And so we missed the strategical advantage of the Germans being engaged in the East. We thought completely defensively and of ourselves."
Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, p. 249.
Are you suggesting that the Brits did exactly (or even remotely) as obliged? Seems like a betrayal to me. And of course, if we're going to revert to the topic of 'the Western Powers', where was France's "within fifteen days" invasion that could have saved both countries, except that it never came? Unless you're saying that technically the treaty was upheld because it was physically impossible for Britain to aid Poland with anything more effective than propaganda leaflets?
Tell me, General, what effect our leaflet raids have had?
- Churchill, in response to lamentation about the Polish Armed Force's effectiveness in fighting the Germans.