Couldn't accept them? I don't follow.
They were told, clearly, that the conditions at Smolensk-North were unsuitable for landing.
They were leading them into areas known to accelerate the rate of descent and they didn't inform them of that.
Known to who, Seanus? The crew of the TU-154M were in Smolensk a few days before - why didn't they pick up on this then? I'm also wondering where you've obtained this from - it's not something being mentioned on any credible aviation forum.
Look at the decline speed and distance covered and you'll see that they don't check out with regular aircraft descent ratios.
That's simply answered - they should have been at 300m over the outer NDB, and instead were quite a bit higher. Thus - they needed a steeper angle of approach in order to correct it.
The critical point at 100m is where the distortion factor came in.
What distortion factor?
The TAWS system wasn't activated until around 10:39:41 as the wavering and dragging air pockets didn't allow for an accurate reading before that.
I'm fairly certain that there would be no need for it to kick in before then - what for? The TU-154M needs about 30-50m to go from descent to climb.
The instruments' calibration was offset by the 'jary' and to a material extent.
Nothing wrong with the calibration - the latest MAK report says that there was nothing wrong with the instruments. The Polish haven't disagreed, so no issue there.
He could have diverted, that's true. In fact, if you had read Polish transcripts, you would have seen the important utterance, 'odchodzimy' (the 2nd pilot, the co-pilot).
Sure. But instead, the captain chose to keep descending.
That clearly shows that they believed they were higher due to looking at the onboard instruments.
Actually - it means he was aware that they had gone below 100m without acquring a visual fix on the runway. It may also indicate that he was following the ATC request - go to 100m, if you can't see the runway, go around.
However, Russian ATC well knew that they were falling at 8m per s as opposed to the normal 3.5 m/s.
Really? The Russians have consistently stated that there was no PAR equipment installed at Smolensk-North. So - how did they fine well know, in the absence of such equipment? The fact that the crew didn't request a PAR approach also lends credence to this. They landed there a few days previously - so they would have known about the possibility of making a PAR approach, if the option existed.
It's very unlikely that the ATC knew - they may have had an idea, but there's nothing they could do - after all, they're not flying the plane.
They saw, on their radars, the real position and the pilots saw the distorted one after the 'jary' effect.
Seanus, that's frankly speaking nonsense. There's absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support this.
They kept telling them that all was ok, a blatant lie!
No, they didn't tell him that everything was ok. They told him what they could - that they were on course and on the glidescope. And - they were - up until they dropped below 100m. From the looks of things, they actually only screwed it up when they dropped below 100m.
he was dragged under by the pulling power which gave him a false reading of his true position.
Where's your source for this? I've never heard of air pockets causing not only a false reading on the barometric altimeter, but also the radar altimeter.
I think jary translates as 'air pockets'. They have a clear effect.
Sure, they do. But the pilot's actions in this case clearly shows that they didn't exist here.
The TAWS system works to varying degrees, depending on the terrain. They were in special terrain there and that altered its ultimate efficacy.
Or - simply put - the system installed simply didn't have the detailed maps for Smolensk-North. It had the basic TAWS system - which did the job fine.
Latest interesting development is that the Polish Air Force refused a Russian offer to add a Russian navigator to the crew, to faclilitate communications and operations.
Interestingly, until last year, when flying to a military airport in Russia, it was compulsory to have a Russian navigator on board.
Well, isn't it lucky that the necessary equipment possessed by the Russians conveniently went missing?
Actually - Smolensk-North has been all but decommissioned as an airfield. It is literally bare bones - one glidepath, little equipment (a basic radar, that seems to be about it) - and even the lights at the start of the runway were specially brought in for the purpose.
They had all the guidance tools but fiddled with things (the bulb issue).
The bulb issue was based one person's claim that they were from Smolensk. There was no evidence whatsoever to back this up - indeed, the Yak reported that they had formed a gate of light and that they saw it.
Polish navigation experts will show this when they get the next instalment from the black boxes.
I'm not holding my breath. But no doubt, the relevant box will show that the autopilot was consciously set to 8m/s.